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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIRE-
MENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
-Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
On March 26, 1971, an attempted robbery of a pizza parlor in
Rochester, New York, resulted in the proprietor of the establishment
being killed. Five months later, pursuant to information from another
police officer that an informant had provided a possible lead to the
crime, a detective from the Rochester Police Department questioned
the informant. Another informant, himself an inmate awaiting trial for
burglary, was also questioned and was unable to give the detective
enough information from which to obtain a warrant for petitioner
Dunaway's arrest.' Nevertheless, the detective ordered other detectives
to "pick up" Dunaway and "bring him in."
Three detectives located Dunaway at a neighbor's house and took
him "into custody."2 He was not told that he was under arrest, al-
though he would have been physically restrained if he had attempted
to leave.3 He was taken by the officers in a police car to police head-
quarters and placed in an interrogation room. After being questioned
Dunaway made inculpatory statements and drew sketches pertaining
to the crime. Prior to any questions being asked of him, however, he
was given Miranda' warnings, whereupon he waived counsel and an-
swered questions of the officers.'
At his trial for attempted robbery and felony murder, Dunaway
moved to suppress the statements6 and sketches. His motion was de-
1An informant told another detective that a James Cole had stated that he and a man
whose first name was Irving were involved in the crime. The informant identified
Dunaway from the police file photos. Upon learning this information, a detective inter-
viewed Cole. Cole denied that he had been involved in the crime, but said that he had
been told about it by an inmate named Hubert Adams. Adams had supposedly men-
tioned to Cole that Adams' brother had told Adams that he and a man named Irving,
who was also known as "Axelrod," were involved in the crime. Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 203 n.1 (1979).
'Id. at 203.
31d.
'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Generally, Miranda emphasized the consti-
tutional protections of the right to remain silent, the right to consult with an attorney
and have him present during questioning, and the right to have counsel appointed if an
accused cannot afford to hire his own. Miranda further requires an affirmative acknowl-
edgment that one understands his rights, combined with a knowing, willing, and intelli-
gent waiver of these rights.
Id.
'442 U.S. at 203.
'Id. Dunaway made one statement within an hour after being picked up and being
placed in the interrogation room. The following morning he made a second, more com-
plete statement. Id. at 203 n.2.
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nied and he was convicted.' Initially, the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction without opinion.8 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case9 for further
consideration in light of the Court's intervening decision in Brown v.
Illinois."
Upon remand the trial court was directed to make further factual
findings as to whether there had been a detention of Dunaway, and
whether there had been probable cause for such detention." Further,
the trial court was directed, in the event that there had been a deten-
tion without probable cause, to determine the further question of
whether the confessions were then tainted by the illegal arrest or
whether they had been sufficiently removed so as to purge the taint. 2
The trial court, subsequent to a supplementary suppression hearing,
determined that Dunaway's motion to suppress had merit although the
confessions were made in full compliance with Miranda v. Arizona.'
The trial court held that the police lacked probable cause sufficient to
support Dunaway's arrest and further, that the compliance with
Miranda, by itself, did not purge the taint of the defendant's illegal
arrest." The court rejected the state's reliance and argument on People
v. Morales5 as a justification for Dunaway's detention; the argument
being that the detention had been only investigatory and outside the
requirement of probable cause for arrest. Accordingly, Dunaway's mo-
tion to suppress was then granted. 6
'Id. at 203.
'People v. Dunaway, 42 App. Div. 2d 689, 346 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1973), affd, 35 N.Y.2d
741, 320 N.E.2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1974).
'422 U.S. 1053 (1975).
422 U.S. 590 (1975). Brown was formerly arrested on less than probable cause, re-
ceived Miranda warnings, confessed and was convicted. The Court reversed, holding
that in order to use a confession obtained following an illegal arrest, it must be shown
that the confession met fifth amendment standards of voluntariness and that the causal
connection between the illegal arrest and the confession was sufficiently broken to purge
the primary taint of the illegal arrest. Id. at 601-04.
1138 N.Y.2d 812, 813-14, 345 N.E.2d 583, 583-84. 382 N.Y.S.2d 40, 40-41 (1975).
"d.
"384 U.S. 436.
"442 U.S. at 205.
"-22 N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 307, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1968). The New York Court of
Appeals upheld Morales' conviction and custodial questioning as being investigatory and
not requiring probable cause. Id. at 64-65, 238 N.E.2d at 314, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 907-08.
The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded, but reserved the issue of what
constitutes investigatory detention, which is the same issue in the instant case. Morales v.
New York, 396 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1969). Upon remand, the New York courts determined
that Morales had gone to police headquarters and submitted to questioning voluntarily.
People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d 129, 366 N.E.2d 248, 397 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1018 (1978).
"442 U.S. at 206.
[Vol. 1:449
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A divided state appellate division reversed. 7 The appellate division
majority relied on the New York Court of Appeals' reaffirmation in
Morales that, "[liaw enforcement officials may detain an individual
upon reasonable suspicion for questioning for a reasonable and brief
period of time under carefully controlled conditions which are ample
to protect the individual's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights."18 The
appellate division further held that if Dunaway's detention were
illegal, the taint of that illegal detention was sufficiently purged to
allow admission of the sketches and statements into evidence. The
New York Court of Appeals dismissed Dunaway's application for leave
to appeal."9
The United States Supreme Court once again granted certiorari "to
clarify the Fourth Amendment's requirements as to the permissible
grounds for custodial interrogation. '"20 The Court viewed the intrusion
to Dunaway's privacy as a seizure of his person and it said that his
seizure was for all practical purposes indistinguishable from a tradi-
tional arrest. The Court explained this viewpoint by discussing the
"facts" surrounding his arrest, i.e. he was not questioned where he was
found, he was taken from a friend's house, transported in a police car
and placed in an interrogation room and never informed that he was
"free to go," and if he had attempted to leave, he would have been
restrained. The Court continued its analysis by a historical overview of
the requirement of probable cause saying that probable cause had
roots deep in American history and hostility to seizures made "on mere
suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment. "21
The Court stated that a seizure of persons, including investigatory
detention for custodial interrogation, is only "reasonable" if supported
by probable cause, unless the seizure falls within the narrowly defined
limitations emphasized in cases employing a balancing test.
2
1
The Court quoted from two decisions it had rendered since Terry v.
Ohio2 which confirm the conclusion that the treatment of the petition-
er, whether technically characterized as an arrest, must be supported
by probable cause .2
" 61 App. Div. 2d 299, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1978).
"Id. at 302, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (quoting People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d at 135, 366
N.E.2d at 251, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 590 and later quoted in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
at 206).
"g442 U.S. at 206.
2°id"
"Id. at 213.
nld. at 214. Cases that have applied a balancing test include: Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
0 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
11442 U.S. at 214.
1980]
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Quoting from Davis v. Mississippi,25 the Court said:
[T]o argue that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the investiga-
tory stage is fundamentally to misconceive the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. Investigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers of
innocent persons to the harrassment and ignominy incident to involun-
tary detention. Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment
was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of
our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed 'arrests' or 'investiga-
tory detentions.'
2 6
The Court reviewed Brown v. Illinois27 and stated that in that case:
The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact was
virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowl-
edged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action was 'for inves-
tigation' or for 'questioning' . . . . The arrest, both in design and in
execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedi-
tion for evidence in the hope that something might turn up.2"
The Court concluded that any detention for custodial interrogation
requires police to have probable cause prior thereto. Therefore, the
Rochester police violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments when
they seized the petitioner without probable cause and transported him
to police headquarters for interrogation.29 The Court ruled that
Dunaway's confessions and sketches were not admissible since there
had been no intervening event sufficient to break the connection be-
tween his "illegal detention" and his confessions. Accordingly, the
Court reversed his conviction."0
Mr. justice Rehnquist, who was joined by Mr. Chief justice Burger,
dissented maintaining that if the majority had done no more than de-
cide the legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause
for a full arrest he could have agreed with the Court. However, since
the majority did not decide the custodial questioning issue, but rather
held that there had been a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment and that the evidence was tainted, the majority had failed
to answer the question that they had proposed to answer."
ANALYSIS
The Court determined that Dunaway had in fact been "seized"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Accordingly the evi-
u394 U.S. 721 (1969).
2442 U.S. at 214-15 (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. at 726-27).
"422 U.S. at 590 (1975).
"Id. at 605, quoted in 442 U.S. at 216.
"442 U.S. at 216.
"Id. at 218-19.
"442 U.S. at 22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. at
[Vol. 1:449
FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENT
dence against him, his confessions and sketches, were suppressed as
being tainted by an illegal arrest; such evidence having failed to be
sufficiently purged so as to dissipate the taint of the illegal arrest. 2
Further, the Court purports "to clarify the Fourth Amendment's
requirements as to the permissible grounds for custodial interrogation
. .And finally, the Court attempts to compare the instant case
with that of Brown,3' and to distinguish the instant case from those
cases employing a balancing test. 5
It is the author's opinion that the Court's decision fails to take into
account several factors. First, it fails to distinguish arrest, and the ele-
ments of arrest, from investigative procedure. Secondly, the Court mis-
takenly compares facts of the instant case with those in Brown. Final-
ly, the Court fails to decide the issue at bar and to clarify the
"grounds" for anything other than actual arrest.
Police investigative powers
Criminal investigation involves the gathering of facts for the pur-
pose of protecting citizens and solving crimes. Generally, police offi-
cers have four basic investigative powers.36 These powers are stop,
frisk, 7 question, and detain. It is well established that police officers
may temporarily detain and question suspects during the general in-
vestigation of a crime.
Terry v. Ohio' established the test for determining when police-
citizen encounters become a restraint sufficient to be a seizure under
the prescription of the fourth amendment. A seizure occurs when an
officer by means of physical force or by a show of authority has in
some manner restrained the liberty of a citizen.39
Reviewing the guarantee against unreasonable seizures of persons, it
is noted that prior to Terry, this safeguard was analyzed in terms of
arrest, the probable cause supporting that arrest, and the warrants
nid.
uld. at 206.
"Ild. at 215-19.
uld. at 208-14.
UJ. CREAMER, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE 22, 40 (1968). These four
investigative powers are listed under the heading of investigative powers and are distin-
guished from the arrest powers of police which are search, seizure, and force-restraint. It
is noted that although these investigative powers and arrest powers are not per se item-
ized, they are each referred to and distinguished from one another in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1.
"SIt should be noted that in order for a police officer to conduct a lawful frisk of an
individual, the officer must follow the prerequisites established in Terry. These prereq-
uisites are that the officer have some valid reason for stopping the individual and some
reason to fear for his (the officer's) safety. In other words the officer must reasonably
suspect that the individual is concealing a weapon on his person. Probable cause is not
required to frisk.
ns392 U.S. 1.
"Id. at 19 n.16.
t9801
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based upon probable cause.4" The term "arrest" was synonymous with,
and construed to be "those seizures governed by the Fourth Amend-
ment." 1 And whereas warrants were not required in every situation,"
the requirement of probable cause was treated as an absolute
necessity."
The Court recognized for the first time in Terry an exception to the
absolute requirement of probable cause prior to seizures of persons.
The Court established a narrow exception to permit an officer to
search for weapons when the officer has reason to believe that "he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.""
This limited intrusion for the protection of the officer was balanced
against the privacy rights of the individual suspect and the necessity of
protecting the officer was found to outweigh the intrusion.
In Escobedo v. Illinois,5 the Court was asked to decide at what
point in police investigatory procedure a suspect's right to counsel
under the sixth amendment attached. The Court held that when the
police investigation shifts from that of a general nature and begins to
focus its attention in an accusatory manner on the particular suspect,
the suspect must be given the warnings under guidelines later set out
in Miranda, or anything else the suspect may say during questioning
may not be used as evidence against him.'
In Davis, cited by the Court majority in the instant case, an "inves-
tigatory detention" was held unreasonable and therefore prohibited by
the fourth amendment. The case involved a young black youth who
was indiscriminately "picked up," as were other young blacks, and
subjected to interrogation and fingerprinting for the purpose of match-
ing the fingerprints with those taken from the crime scene in an effort
to find a suspect. There was no probable cause for any of the seizures
and the state, at no time, asserted or offered evidence that Davis vol-
untarily accompanied police." The police simply went out and picked
up everyone they saw who possibly matched the description of a
"young black man."
Since Terry the Court has held that on the basis of an informant's
unverified tip, a police officer was justified in the forcible stop and
"See e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
11442 U.S. at 208.
"See e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967).
"See e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
"392 U.S. at 27.
-378 U.S. 478 (1963).
"Id. at 490-91.
394 U.S. at 728.
[Vol. 1:449
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seizure of a person for the purpose of frisking him for narcotics and a
gun."' Mr. Chief Justice Burger recently stated:
We have recognized that in some circumstances an officer may detain a
suspect briefly for questioning although he does not have 'probable
cause' to believe that the suspect is involved in criminal activity, as is
required for a traditional arrest. . . . However, we have tequired the
officers to have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the
individual is involved in criminal activity.4"
The Court recently decided several cases regarding investigative
stops of vehicles and persons. In each of the cases" the one significant
common factor was an actual restraint or seizure of the person during
the initial stage of police contact. In the cases examined, regardless of
whether the seizure was physical, forceful, temporary, flagrantly un-
reasonable, or one requiring a balance of interests, each case "lived or
died" on the determination as to the reasonableness of the seizure
under the fourth amendment. The cases where seizure was held un-
constitutional were cases involving involuntary submission5 to author-
ity or questioning rather than voluntary submission" as in the instant
case. To the contrary, all the cases involving voluntary submissions
were held to be constitutional.53
Proper investigation v. improper seizure
It can be argued that the instant case, and Morales v. New York,
and many other cases involving police investigations are not seizures
and do not fall within the purview of the fourth amendment at the
initial stage of the police encounter.5
The question of whether a person's assent to accompany a police
officer becomes a "seizure" within the fourth amendment or whether
it is simply a voluntary proceeding is determined by the police offi-
cer's conduct; that is, whether the officer's conduct is coercive or phys-
"Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
"Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
"443 U.S. 47; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873.
"See e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590; Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721.
"See e.g., People v. Morales, 42 N.Y.2d 129, 366 N.E.2d 248, 397 N.Y.S.2d 587
(1977). After remand from the United States Supreme Court the trial court determined
that Morales had voluntarily submitted himself to police for questioning and this deci-
sion was upheld by the appellate division and by the state supreme court.
"Pennsylvania v. Minns, 434 U.S. 106; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543;
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143.
"Compare United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543; United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1;
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294.
1980]
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ically threatening, or is authoritative enough on a person's freedom so
as to render him "in custody." 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1968
stated that "brief, informal detentions for a limited inquiry are not
arrests and the peace officer need not possess the probable cause neces-
sary to make an arrest." ' It is submitted that this decision correctly
states the law of police investigatory procedure, as previously estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court.
It is a common police procedure to investigate crimes by approach-
ing witnesses and possible suspects and inquiring as to whether they
are willing to answer questions pertaining to a particular matter.57 An
officer cannot indiscriminantly stop and question citizens. However,
where there is a sufficient reason, such as a reasonable suspicion or
where the public safety and security demands, reasonable inquiries
into the identity of persons and their reasons for being where they are
have generally been upheld. These inquiries are generally referred to
as field interviews."8
In addition to the above mentioned investigative powers, police
officers have three arrest powers. The arrest powers are (a) forces,
(b) search, and (c) seizure or restraint.59 Anytime an officer uses one of
these powers he has made an arrest, and unless that arrest is justified
by sufficient probable cause prior to invoking the power, the arrest is
illegal.60
To better understand the exact nature of an arrest and to better
illuminate the Court's failure to distinguish Dunaway's so-called sei-
zure from that of a real arrest, it is appropriate to examine the four
basic elements of a criminal arrest. First, the person making the arrest
must have the lawful authority to do so (authority vested in him by
common law or statute). Second, there must be an intent to use this
authority by the person making the arrest. Third, there must be an
actual or constructive seizure or restraint of the person to be arrested.
Fourth, there must be a comprehension and understanding by the ar-
"See generally Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1.
The court in Mathiason defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." 429 U.S. at 495 (citing Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444).
"Wartson v. United States, 400 F.2d 25, 28 (9th Cir. 1968).
"See generally 1. GARDNER & V. MANIAN, PRINCII'AItS AND CASES OF THE LAW OF AR-
REST, SEARIIH, AND SEIZttRI.- (1974); K. McCIEEI)Y, TIIEORY AND METHODS OF POLICE
PATROL. (1974); INTEIRNATIONAI. ASSO(IATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE PATROL OI'ER-
ATION (2d ed. 1970).
-392 U.S. at 14, 26-27. Compare People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965), for an excellent discussion of this
subject matter.
"J. CREAMER, supra note 36, at 50.
"U.S. CONSr. amend. IV. See 392 U.S. at 22.
[Vol. 1:449
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rested person of the fact that he is being arrested and why he is being
arrested."1 Arrest does not include the questioning of a witness to a
crime who is not in custody. Only when custody occurs does the "stop-
ping" of a person escalate to the status of an arrest."2
A defendant does not have a constitutional right to be arrested. For
example, in Hoffa v. United States, 3 the defendant argued that once
police had sufficient probable cause to arrest him, they were required
to do so, and any evidence collected after they had probable cause to
arrest was inadmissible because he was not given fifth and sixth
amendment warnings. The Court rejected this argument and said that
police do not have to guess at the precise moment when they have
probable cause to arrest a suspect. 6" Police risk violating the fourth
amendment requirement of prior, sufficient probable cause if they act
too soon and risk violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel if
they wait too long. Law enforcement officials are under no constitu-
tional duty to halt a criminal investigation the moment they have the
minimum evidence to establish probable cause.
In a six-three decision the Court in Adams v. Williams,5 extended
and reaffirmed stop and frisk as a legitimate police power. Of even
more importance however was the Court's discussion of a policeman's
duty to follow up information given to him by an informant about a
crime. In Adams, an officer was informed that a man seated in a car
was armed with a pistol and had narcotics in his possession. The person
was seated in the front passenger seat of the car. The officer went to
the car, tapped on the window and told the defendant to roll the win-
dow down. When the window was rolled down the officer immediate-
ly reached in and seized a gun from the waistband of the defendant's
trousers. The officer arrested the suspect. A search was then made of
the defendant and the automobile. A machete was found under the
front seat. Twenty-one cellophane packets of white powder were
found in the defendant's wallet and six packets were found in a jar in
the defendant's coat pocket. Ten of the packets contained heroin.
The Court upheld the arrest and seizure of evidence.6 It is to be
noted however, that the initial contact was nothing more than an offi-
cer's investigation based on an informant's unverified tip. The Court
stated that the fourth amendment does not require a policeman who
"Gustafson v. State, 243 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (citing Melton v.
State, 75 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1954) ). Note that Gustafson was subsequently appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which held that a full search of a person made incident to
a lawful custodial arrest did not violate the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Gustaf-
son v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
6392 U.S. at 16.
62385 U.S. 293 (1966).
'lid. at 310.
6 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
"Id. at 147-49.
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lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause for
arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a
criminal to escape. The Court stated that a brief stop of a suspicious
individual may be reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer
at the time."7
In Beckwith v. United States,8 the Court reviewed a tax fraud
prosecution and conviction wherein IRS agents went to a man's house
and advised him they were agents and were investigating possible
criminal violations involving him. The agents did not, per se, advise
the man of the Miranda warnings, although they did read certain fifth
and sixth amendment rights to him. The man answered questions for
approximately three hours and made certain statements. The man
later, at the agent's request, went to his place of business, where he
supplied certain books and records to the agents. At his trial, the dis-
trict court denied his motion to suppress and the court of appeals af-
firmed his conviction.69
The United States Supreme Court, in affirming the court of ap-
peals, distinguished the "non-custodial police investigation" from the
"custodial-type" investigation requiring Miranda warnings." The
Court again stated that the "critical stage" when the investigation be-
gins to "focus" on the particular individual only occurs when "ques-
tioning [is] initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way. '"' The Court recognized that there were some
situations where non-custodial interrogation might lead to confessions
not freely self-determined, but the IRS case was not one of that type
because "the entire interview was free of coercion.
' '
7
2
Scrutinizing the majority opinion
In Dunaway, the majority relied heavily on the conclusion of the
trial court. It must be noted that the trial court was reversed twice,
and after remand, it changed its earlier position and held that
Dunaway had been unlawfully detained without probable cause." It is
likewise interesting to note that the majority ignores the recital of the
officer's testimony by the New York Appellate Division, wherein it is
shown that Dunaway voluntarily agreed to accompany the officers and
to talk with them.1 '
'
7id. at 146.
-425 U.S. 341 (1976).
"United States v. Beckwith, 510 F.2d 741 (1975).
7*425 U.S. at 344.
7 Id. at 347 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S at 444).
'lid. at 348 (citing with approval language from the court of appeals, 510 F.2d at
743).
7'442 U.S. at 205-06.
"61 App. Div. 2d 299, 301-02, 492 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (1978).
[Vol. 1:449
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The Court indicated that the constitutional propriety of an investi-
gative seizure upon less than probable cause for purposes of detention
and/or interrogation were not specifically addressed in Terry." The
Court refused the State of New York's urging that the balancing test of
Terry and its progeny16 applied to the instant case. The Court reasoned
that "[t]he narrow intrusions involved in those cases were judged by a
balancing test"" rather than the traditional requirement of probable
cause because the limited intrusions in Terry and following cases "fell
far short of the kind of intrusions associated with an arrest.""8 How-
ever, the constitutional propriety of investigative seizures on less than
probable cause, as heretofore shown, is exactly what Terry addressed.
Furthermore, the actions of the IRS agents in Beckwith were much
more involved, more accusatory and more probing than the actions of
the officers in the instant case. Likewise, Beckwith appears to be more
"custodial" in nature.
Petitioner Dunaway was not seized within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. He was neither "seized without probable cause,"
nor "illegally detained." In fact, Dunaway was not "seized" nor "de-
tained," lawfully or unlawfully, within the legal definition of those
words. Detention, when applied to persons, implies that the person has
been in some manner prevented against his will from going where he
desires."1
As Mr. Justice Rehnquist reasonably observes in his dissent to the
instant case:
There is obviously nothing in the Fourth Amendment that prohibits
police from calling from their vehicle to a particular individual on the
street and asking him to come over and talk with them; nor is there
anything in the Fourth Amendment that prevents the police from
knocking on the door of a person's house and when the person answers
the door, inquiring whether he is willing to answer questions they wish
to put to him. 'Obviously, not all personal intercourse between police-
men and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.' [Citation omitted.]
Voluntary questioning not involving any seizure for Fourth Amendment
purposes may take place under any number of varying circumstances.
And the occasions will not be few when a particular individual agrees
voluntarily to answer questions that the police wish to put to him either
on the street, at the station, or in his house, and later regrets his willing-
ness to answer those questions. However, such morning-after regrets do
not render involuntary responses that they were voluntary at the time
they were made."0
7442 U.S. at 210 n.12.
6See note 22, supra.
"442 U.S. at 212.
?Hid.
7 Everett, Ridley & Co. v. Holcomb, 1 Ga. App. 794, 58 S.E. 287, 289 (1907).
"442 U.S. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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When the police officers went to interview Dunaway they searched
for him at a neighbor's house. Dunaway answered the door, where-
upon the officer identified himself and asked him his name. Then the
officer asked Dunaway if he would accompany the officers to police
headquarters for questioning. Dunaway agreed. He was not arrested.
Neither was he informed of arrest, nor warned not to resist or flee. No
weapons were displayed by the officers and Dunaway was not hand-
cuffed. Dunaway was not touched, nor was his freedom of action re-
strained by the police in any way.81
It is noteworthy that in Brown, contrary to the Court's factual com-
parison with Dunaway, two detectives of the Chicago police broke into
Brown's apartment and searched it. When Brown entered the apart-
ment, he was told that he was under arrest, and was searched at gun-
point. Brown was then handcuffed and transported by police vehicle
to police headquarters where he was interrogated.82
The real issue in Dunaway is whether or not he was arrested. It is
submitted that from the evidence, the testimony, and the facts sur-
rounding the initial encounter, that Dunaway was not arrested. The
officer's words and acts did not indicate any intent to exercise his law-
ful authority to arrest, nor could Dunaway have understood that he
was "under arrest."
"As a general rule, every person who is arrested and transported in
a police vehicle should be handcuffed. The officer has a responsibility
not only to himself but to the person he has arrested.""3 In a custody
situation an officer "is dealing with an unknown human variable and
cannot be too cautious."84 Even a docile drunk may be a wanted felon,
or may become violent. Further, since handcuffing eliminates the pos-
sibility of suicide, an officer does not have to face the difficult task of
explaining how a person in custody was able to take his own life while
in police custody. "The handcuffed suspect presents less danger to
himself and the officer."" It can be assumed that if detectives, dis-
patched to bring in a suspect thought to be guilty of attempted rob-
bery and felony murder, reasonably believed that the suspect was a
prime suspect, thereby "focusing" on him, they would at least draw
their guns and handcuff him.
In its eagerness to examine causal connections between confessions
and accusatory restraints or "custodial interrogations" resulting in con-
fessions after an illegal arrest, the Court failed to distinguish between
actual "seizures" of persons and investigative procedures, where police
officers, during investigations of a general nature, go out and question
811d. at 222-23.
12422 U.S. at 593.
"3K. M:CRE.M:n, TiinoniR AND METHODS OF POLICE PATROL, 97 (1974).
8
41Id.
mid.
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witnesses and possible suspects who are willing to answer questions in a
"non-custodial" situation.
The Court has failed to "clarify the Fourth Amendment's require-
ments as to the permissible grounds for custodial interrogation .... "",
The majority has in fact held that detention for custodial interrogation
intrudes so severely on fourth amendment interests that the traditional
safeguards against illegal arrest must be triggered."' By so holding the
Court has totally confused any intelligent understanding of exactly
what is "custodial."
A dangerous precedent
It is submitted that the Court's failure to distinguish between volun-
tary submission to questioning and detention for the purpose of inter-
rogation has established a dangerous precedent. Foreseeably, every
time a person is stopped during an investigation for either a driver's
license check, 88 a field interview, 9 or during general questioning per-
taining to an unsolved crime of any nature, or for any reason other
than "protective frisks," traffic violations, or to prevent aliens from
entering the country, the police-citizen encounter can be successfully
challenged as an unlawful detention.
The obvious result of such a precedent would be that it would en-
able the suspect who has voluntarily answered questions and later re-
grets his decision to simply allege that he was "seized," whereupon his
confessions, and any other evidence so obtained will be suppressed as
"tainted," thereby making them inadmissible.
When police officers encounter persons during an investigation,
those persons may simply refuse to answer questions, especially if
doing so would incriminate them. However, if during a police-citizen
encounter, a police officer without a show of force, a threat, or coer-
cive intimidation, asks a citizen to answer questions or to accompany
the officer to police headquarters, whereupon the citizen voluntarily
agrees to do so and later makes a knowing and int'elligent waiver of his
rights and confesses to a crime, then the action is not an unlawful sei-
zure and the confession is not tainted. For a court to hold otherwise is
to suggest- that police officers should never approach any witness or
possible suspect and ask him questions pertaining to any crime unless
the officer already has sufficient probable cause to arrest.
Likewise, until such time as a person who has voluntarily submitted
to questions is knowingly detained or prevented from exercising his
freedom to walk away, it is difficult to characterize as "detention,"
"seizure," or "arrest," the voluntary exercise of answering questions. It
"442 U.S. at 206.
"'Id. at 216.
"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648.
"Brown v. Texas, 44.3 U.S. 47.
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simply is not a restriction on a person's liberty when he answers ques-
tions or accompanies police knowing he is free to leave at any time.
It is predicted that police officers will adjust and compensate for
the confusion surrounding investigative procedure by making certain
all of their police-citizen encounters fall within those types of situa-
tions which have been found acceptable by the Court. We will begin
to see a considerable number of cases involving "bulges," "furtive
movement," "moving violations," and other activities necessitating
frisks or vehicular stops and arrests, followed by interrogation. To be
sure, many arrests will occur, and pretextual though they may be,
these arrests will result in confessions, convictions, and litigation.
It is suggested that there is a major difference between seizures
amounting to custodial situations and those temporary detentions in-
volving frisks and the like. Further, there is a difference between these
types of police actions and those situations where citizens voluntarily
submit to police questions. In essence, there is a major difference be-
tween "seizures" and investigations. Police officers should not be hin-
dered in the investigation of crimes by a decision which creates a state
of confusion as to what is expected or required of an officer in per-
forming his duties. Nor should a decision allow criminals to walk free
simply because they have had their voluntary confessions suppressed
by successfully arguing that they had been compelled to talk to the
police. Instead the Court should hand down a decision which correctly
differentiates among police investigative procedures and sets forth
lucid guidelines therefor.
R. Glenn Arnold
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